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Abstract
This paper analyzes socially optimal forest taxation when the government has a
binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of
forest taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax,
site value tax or profit tax. A combination of distortionary unit (or yield) tax and
timber tax can also be used to collect the tax revenue in a non-distortionary way.
In the Hartman model with amenity services as a public good, the optimal
design consists of a non-distortionary tax and a Pigouvian tax, which adjusts the
private rotation age to the socially optimal one. Now only the site productivity tax
is non-distortionary, while unit, yield, timber, site value and profit taxes generally
serve as a corrective Pigouvian taxes. In the absence of a non-distortionary tax,
a combination of unit (or yield) and timber taxes can often be used to both tax
revenue collection and Pigouvian correction.
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Forest taxation has always been a central issue in forest economics – even to the extent
that it gave rise to Martin  Faustmann’s celebrated contribution 1849. Since the
renessance of the rotation analysis in forest economics started by Samuelson’s seminal
review (1976), the effects of alternative forest taxes on the Faustmann rotation age have
been extensively studied (see e.g. Chang 1982, Johansson and Löfgren 1985). Respective
comparative static analysis of foret taxation within the Hartman model, which includes
amenity services of forests, has been solved rigorously in Koskela and Ollikainen  2000.
In contrast to the frequent discussion of forest taxation issues since the beginning of
forest economics, the analysis of the socially optimal design of forest taxation is largely
an unexplored area. There are two notable attempts to tackle this issue, namely,
Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1988) and Englin and Klan (1990).1 Gamponia and
Mendelsohn (1988) focus on the excess burden of yield and timber taxes in the absence
of externalities (amenity services) in forestry.2 They recognize the difficulties in finding
analytical solution for the excess burden of forest taxation and concentrate on numerical
simulations. They end up to stress the use of neutral forest taxes, or combinations of
distortionary forest taxes, which minimize the deadweight loss of forest taxation.
Englin and Klan (1990) study optimal forest taxation policy in the absence of a binding
tax revenue requirement and in the very special case, where amenity services of forest
stands are a public good, but forest owners value only harvest revenue, not amenity
services. Now private harvesting reduces amenities available and  causes a negative
externality to recreators, so that neutral forest taxes are no longer desirable. What is
needed, are  distortionary taxes, which shift the market behavior towards the social
optimum. To this end Englin and Klan (1990) solve optimal Pigouvian tax rates, which
equate the privately optimal rotation age with the socially optimal rotation.
                                                
1 A closely related literature is also a discussion about the forest taxation in an economy with an
ordinary and an Austrian sector with the focus is on how to design distortionary taxation in an
economy with an ordinary and an Austrian sector so as to achieve intrasector and intersectoral
efficiency in the absence of government budget constraint (see Kovenock and Rothschild 1983
and Kovenock 1986). This literature this is, however, not relevant for our case, because we focus
solely on forestry.
2  Here the excess burden refers to the magnitude of the rotation age distortions caused by forest
taxes.4
Both these analyses neglect two factors which seem to be highly relevant for the optimal
design of forest taxation. First, they neglect the fact that usually the governmental forest
tax policy is not chosen freely, because the government has to collect tax revenue from
forestry for financing the national budget.  Second, empirical evidence suggests that
private landowners do value amenity services (see e.g. Binkley 1981, Kuuluvainen et al.
1996). Therefore, one should ask a couple of questions. How does this behavioral feature
affect the optimal forest taxation, i.e., will the need for Pigouvian taxes vanish in favor of
neutral forest taxation in the true Hartman framework? Does the tax revenue requirement
modify the optimal taxation in the Faustmann and Hartman models, respectively.
These two issues are in the focus of our paper. We assume that the government has to
collect an exogenously given tax revenue from forestry and it maximizes welfare from
forestry in a partial equilibrium setting with an exogenous timber price. The social
welfare function depends on the welfare of private landowners, as well as on those by the
citizens, who might have free access to the amenity services of private forest stand. We
consider optimal taxation first in the Faustmann framework by assuming that the only
thing the society values is the net present value of harvest revenue from timber
production. Then we allow for the joint production of timber and amenities, and study
optimal forest taxation in the Hartman framework augmented with recreators who enjoy
amenity services from private forests.
Given that the chosen forest tax forms vary from country to country, we consider a broad
set of forest taxes. Our taxes include the most popular forms of property and harvest
taxes, as well as the profit tax. More specifically, the class of (i) property taxes levied on
land value contains three alternative taxes. The site productivity tax is paid annually and
is based on the yield potentiality of a given site irrespective of the actual harvests or
standing timber. The site value tax is a proportional tax on the land value and paid
annually. A property tax may be also levied on the value of trees, and is often called
timber tax. Second class of forest taxes consists of (ii) harvest taxes. The most common
version of harvest taxes is  the yield tax, which is levied on the harvest revenue.
Alternatively, a unit tax levied on the timber volume harvested can be used. Third, we
also study (iii) a profit tax levied on the net timber revenue the landowner gets from the
forests.5
We show that in the Faustmann framework optimal forest taxation consists of neutral
forest taxes. Among the class of forest taxes under our study, site value tax, site
productivity tax and profit tax have this property. A combination of harvest and timber
tax can also be used to collect the tax revenue in a non-distortionary way. Allowing for
amenity services (Hartman model) changes the optimal design of tax policy. In most
cases optimal design consists of a combination of a neutral tax and a distortionary tax.
While the neutral tax helps to collect the tax revenue, the distortionary one adjusts the
amenity production to the socially optimal level. Now only the site productivity tax is
always non-distortionary, while the site value and profit taxes are neutral only in a
special case. Again, in the absence of a non-distortionary tax a combination of a unit
(yield) and timber tax can under certain conditions be used to both tax revenue collection
and Pigouvian correction of externality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the basic
framework, while  sections 3 and 4 provide the analysis of optimal taxation in the
Faustmann and in the Hartman framework, respectively. Finally, there is a brief
concluding section 5.
2. Basic Framework
In designing the socially  optimal forest taxation we follow conventional public
economics approach by modeling the interaction between the government and the
representative landowner as a two- stage game. In the first stage the government, acting
as a Stackelberg leader, decides about its forest taxation policy and commits to it. In the
second stage private landowners choose their harvesting conditional on the chosen tax
policy. The structure of this section follows this idea by applying the backward
induction. Hence, we analyze first in section 2.1 how the chosen forms of forest taxes
affect the privately optimal rotation age to obtain the landowners’ reaction function. In
section 2.2 we introduce the social welfare function, and the government budget
constraint, which are then used to derive the design of socially optimal forest taxation in
the subsequent chapters 3 and 4.6
2.1 Behavior of the Representative Landowner
Given that the landowners’ objectives may differ, we will focus on two basic rotation
frameworks, the Faustmann and the Hartman models. The comparative statics of forest
taxes in the Faustmann model are already well-known (Chang 1982, and Johansson and
Löfgren 1985), while that of the Hartman model is derived in Koskela and Ollikainen
2000. In what follows we present briefly results needed  for the analysis of optimal
taxation, and ask the interested reader to consult above references for exact derivations.
We analyze the Hartman model, and then give the results for the Faustmann model as the
special case.
Assume that the private landowner values both the net harvest revenue and the amenity
services from forest stands. Based on Hartman (1976) we postulate the following quasi-
linear objective function in the absence of taxes
E V W + = .  (1)









V , where p is stumpage price,  ) (T f  is the growth of the stand as a
function of its age T  with the conventional convex-concave properties and c denotes the












ds e s F e
E , describes the present value of
amenity services over all rotations, where and F(s) is the flow of amenities for the stand
of age s.
The first-order condition for the maximization of (1) is  0 = + = T T T E V W , and it can be
rewritten as
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = - + - - ¢ = rE T F rV T rpf T f p WT .3  (2)
                                                
3  We denote the partial derivatives by primes for functions with one argument and by subscripts
for functions with many arguments. Hence, e.g.  T
T f T f ¶
¶ = ¢
) ( ) (  for  ) (T f , while7
According to equation (2), the private landowner equates the marginal benefit of delaying
the harvest to age  T, defined by ) ( ) ( ' T F T pf + , to the marginal opportunity cost of
delaying the harvest, defined by  ) ( ) ( E V r T rpf + + . Equation (2) reveals that the relation
of the Hartman rotation age to the  Faustmann rotation age depends on the sign of
rE T F - ) ( . It can be shown that




























- T F as rE T F .4  (3)
Hence, the  Faustmann and Hartman rotations coincide if  0 ) ( = ¢ T F . But when the
amenity valuation increases with the age of the forest stand, the Hartman rotation period
is longer than the Faustmann rotation period and vice versa for the decreasing marginal
amenity valuation.
Next we turn to study the effects of forest taxes in the Harman framework, and as a
special case the Faustmann framework. All forest taxes affect only the site value, i.e., the
Faustmann part V, but depending on the nature of the amenity valuation function they
may change the relative profitability of timber vis’a’vis amenity production.
•  Harvest taxes
If the government levies the yield (t) or the unit tax (t) on harvesting, the after-tax net
revenue from harvesting is defined by equation (4), while the amenity part, E, remains
unchanged so that
1
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) , ( ) , (  for  ) , ( y x A , etc.
4  See Bowes and Krutilla (1985), Johansson and Löfgren (1988), and Koskela and Ollikainen
(2000).8
where  t p p - - ” ) 1 ( ˆ t  is the after-tax stumpage price and V ˆ  the after-tax present value
of the soil.
Differentiating equation (1) in the presence of harvest taxes (4) with respect to T yields
0 ) ( ˆ )) ( ) ( ( ˆ ) , ( ˆ = - + - - ¢ = rE T F V r T rf T f p t WT t .  (5)
The impact of harvest taxes on the private rotation age can be shown to be

































t .5  (6)
In the Faustmann model, where  0 ) ( = -rE T F , both harvest taxes lengthen the private
rotation age since they affect like a decrease in the net stumpage price, while in the
Hartman model the same holds true when the marginal valuation of amenities is
increasing or constant in the age of the stand, i.e. when  0 ) ( ‡ ¢ T F . Under the assumption
0 ) ( ' < T F , however, it is possible that the rotation age is shortened by the harvest taxes.
Property taxes
As for the property taxes we explore first the site value tax (levied directly on the value
of forestland), and the site productivity tax (levied indirectly on administratively set site
quality classification values of forestland). For the site value tax, we denote the annual









If the fraction of the value of the forestland delivered in taxes is  b , we have from
equation (7)  V r b b = , so that the after-tax value of the forestland can be rewritten
                                                
5 For a proof, see Koskela and Ollikainen (2000). The notation  F T and 
H T refers to the rotation
age in the Faustmann and in the Hartman models, respectively.9
V V ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ b b - = . We can express the landowner’s objective function for the site value
tax as
E V W + - = ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ b b ,  (8)
The first-order condition for the maximization of (8) is given by
0 ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )( 1 ( ) ( ˆ = - + - - ¢ - = rE T F rV T rpf T f p WT b b .  (9)
Differentiating (9) with respect to b gives




























T F as T
H
b .  (10)
According to equation (10) the site value tax has no effect on the Faustmann rotation age,
where  0 ) ( ' = T F  by definition. In the Hartman model a rise in the site value tax makes
amenity production relatively more (less) profitable, so that the landowner lengthens
(shortens) the rotation age when  0 ) ( ) ( < > ¢ T F .
In the presence of the site productivity tax, denoted by a(i) where i refers to site index i of
the land, the after-tax land value is given by 
r
i a
V i a V
) (
)) ( ( ˆ - = , so that the objective
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where a(i)/r is the present value of the site productivity tax. The first-order condition is
0 ) ( )) ( ( ˆ = - + = rE T F V i a W T T . The site productivity tax is neutral, because it does not
distort the relative profitability of timber and amenity production. This holds also for the
Faustmann model.10
The timber tax, a, is levied annually on the stumpage value of growing timber volume so
that the net present value of harvest revenue is given by
1
) ( ) (
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U , then
the objective function of the landowner can be written as
E U V W + - = a a) ( ˆ ,  (13)
The first-order condition for the privately optimal rotation age is
0 ) ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ = - + - - - - ¢ = rE T F rU T pf rV T rpf T f p WT a a ,  (14)
where  0 ) ( > -rU T pf  when  0 ) ( > ¢ T f  (see  Koskela and Ollikainen 2000). It is
straightforward to show that timber tax shortens private rotation age irrespective of the
sign of  rE T F - ) ( , i.e. both  0 <
F Ta  and  0 <
H Ta . Timber tax decreases both the value of
standing timber at the harvest time and the opportunity cost of harvesting with the former
effect dominating.
•  Profit tax
In the presence of the profit tax  q  the net harvest revenue is  V V ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ q q - = , and the
private landowner maximizes  E V WT + - = ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ q q . Choosing T optimally gives
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ˆ = - + - = rE T F V W T T q q .  (15)11
The comparative statics of the profit tax is
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q .  (16)
The outcome is qualitatively similar to that of the site value tax for both Faustmann and
Hartman models.
Comparative statics of forest taxation is collected in Table 1. Only the site productivity
tax and the timber tax have qualitatively similar effects in both models. The site value tax
and the profit tax, which are neutral in the Faustmann model, are generally distortionary
in the Hartman model with the exception of site-specific amenities. They, as well as the
harvest taxes, may have positive or negative effects depending on the nature of marginal
amenity valuation.





Harvest tax (x=t,t) 0 >
F
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H
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- - rE T F e rc
rT
Site prod. tax, a 0 =
F
a T 0 =
H
a T
Site value tax, b 0 =
F Tb 0 ) (< ‡
H Tb  as  0 ) ( ) ( ' < ‡ T F
Timber tax, a 0 <
F Ta 0 <
H Ta
Profit tax q 0 =
F
a T 0 ) (< ‡
H Tq  as  0 ) ( ) ( ' < ‡ T F
2.2 Social Welfare Function
In designing forest taxation policy the government is assumed to maximize the social
welfare function. We consider two cases. First, we assume that only harvest revenue
from forestry counts, so that the social welfare function is defined by the indirect net
revenue function of the landowner 
* V (equation 17a). Second, we study a case where
both the landowner and recreators value amenity services from forests. For simplicity the12
amenity valuation function is postulated to be the same for the representative landowner
and recreators.6 When citizens have full access to enjoy the amenity services from private
forests and there are no congestion effects associated with enjoying amenity services of
forests we have the social welfare function (17b).
) , , , , ), ( ( a q b t t i a V SW
F * = (17a)
E n t i a E t i a V SW
H ) 1 ( ) , , , , ), ( ( ) , , , , ), ( ( - + + =
* * a q b t a q b t , (17b)
where n is the number of citizens and (n-1) is the number of recreators.
In the subsequent analysis we assume that there is an exogenous tax revenue target,
denoted by  R . There are alternative ways to formulate the tax revenue requirement in the
case of forestry. Here we assume that the short run government debt or surplus is not
regarded as an important factor, so that all what counts is the discounted sum the tax
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0 ,  (18)
where  b q y , = .
When studying optimal tax policy in next sections we will not assume that all taxes are
present at the same time. We indicate in each case, which taxes are assumed to be
operative.
                                                
6 When the recreators value forest amenities, but the private landowner does not, the social
welfare function would read as  E n t i a V SW
F ) 1 ( ) , , , , ), ( ( - + =
* a q b t . This case yields,
however, qualitatively similar results as the case of (17b) and, therefore, we do not consider it
explicitly. This rather special case has been partly analyzed in Englin and Klan (1990), but in the
absence of the government tax revenue requirement. Moreover, their analysis did not include the
site productivity tax, which is always neutral in the Hartman framework, and they used the site
value tax and the profit tax as neutral taxes. Hence, their results are very special in the sense that
i) they do not allow for tax revenue requirement and ii) they assume that  0 ) ( = ¢ T F  for
landowners.13
3. Socially Optimal Forest Taxation in the Faustmann Framework
A neutral tax is optimal, when the society sees no need to distort the private decisions. As
the comparative statics of rotation age in the Faustmann model revealed, site productivity
tax, site value tax and profit tax are neutral taxes, and have this desirable property. But in
the Hartman model only the site productivity tax is neutral, if the amenity valuation is not
site specific, i.e.,  0 ) ( „ ¢ T F . Therefore, we will use the site productivity tax as our
benchmark tax when studying whether we need other forest taxes for the socially optimal
design of forest taxation.
3.1 Optimal forest taxation in the presence of a neutral tax
The government’s problem is to maximize the social welfare function (17a) subject to the
tax revenue requirement (18). Differentiating the Lagrangian,  ) ( R R V - - = W
* l , with
respect to the site productivity tax a(i) yields  0
1 1
= + - = W
r r
a l ,  so that  1 = l . The
shadow price l represents the marginal cost of public funds which is equal to one. This
means that the government can raise tax revenue without imposing any cost (over
collected tax revenue) on the society.7 Hence, it is an ideal tax instrument to collect the
required revenue without distorting landowner’s privately optimal behavior. This
outcome is due to the fact that site productivity tax is neutral, i.e.,  0 =
H
a T .
When the site productivity tax has been set at the optimal level, a = a*, the optimal yield
tax  t , in the absence of other taxes, can be obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian
Wwith respect to t under the condition  1 = l . This gives
0
) 1 (
















T pf re T f p e
t t t , (19a)
                                                
7 It is straightforward to show that the marginal cost of public funds is equal to one also for the
site value tax b  and for the profit tax q .14
where  0 >
F Tt  and  0
) 1 (







T pf re T f p e , due to the first-order condition (2).
Hence,  0 = W * =a a t  necessitates that the optimal yield tax, 
* =t t , is zero. This result
holds also for the unit tax, because of the definition of these taxes.8
Analogously, when the site productivity tax is set at the optimal level, the first-order
condition for the timber tax in the absence of other taxes is given by
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where  0 <
F Ta , and that  0 ) ) ( ( > -rU T pf , when  0 ) ( > ¢ T f . Hence, the optimal timber
tax rate, 
* =a a , is zero.
To summarize, we have obtained
Result 1.  If the society values only harvest revenue from forests and wishes to collect
a given forest tax revenue, then it should use only a neutral site productivity
tax (or site value or profit tax) and set all distortionary taxes equal to zero.
This result makes sense. In the absence of externalities a neutral tax is optimal, because it
minimizes the deadweight loss of taxation. This result confirms what e.g. Gamponia and
Mendelsohn (1988) pointed out forestry context, though without the exact proof.
3.2 Optimal forest taxation in the absence of neutral taxes
What about if the government does not have site productivity tax or other neutral, lump-
sum tax available? Could we then find a tax mix to collect the required forest tax revenue
without distorting the landowners’ behavior? Our answer is positive.
                                                
8 To obtain the optimality condition for the unit tax, just multiply equation (19a) by the factor
F F
t T p tT t t .15
Differentiating the Lagrangian  W with respect to the unit and timber taxes in the absence
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where  0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( < - ¢ - =
rT rT e T rf T f e A  due to first-order condition (3),
0 ) ) ( ( > - = rU T pf B ,  0 >
F
t T  and  . 0 <
F Ta
On the basis of the first-order conditions (20a) and (20b) one can see that, under the
condition  0 = + B tA a , the privately optimal rotation age of the forest stand is determined
by the following first-order condition
0 = T V  ￿ [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( = + ¢ -
rT rT rT cre T f re T f e p ,
which is exactly the same condition that holds without forest taxes. Hence, this is the
condition for the optimal combination of unit and timber taxes. Solving  0 = + B tA a  for
the ratio of taxes and applying the definitions of A and B yields
0
) ( ) ( ) 1 (









e T rf T f e
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(21)
This tax mix gives a non-distortionary private rotation age. Due to the definition of unit
and yield taxes, this result holds also for a combination of the yield tax and timber tax.
Summing up, we have
Result 2.  If the society values only harvest revenue from forests and wishes to collect
a given forest tax revenue, then  in the absence of neutral taxes a
combination of unit tax and timber tax (or a combination of yield tax and
timber tax) collects the required tax revenue in a non-distortionary way.16
The economic intuition behind this result lies in the use of two distortionary taxes which
affect rotation in an opposing way so that an appropriate combination cancel out each
other’s distortionary effect.9
4. Socially Optimal Forest Taxation in the Hartman Framework
Next we turn to consider the case, which has not been analyzed in the literature, where
the amenity services from forests are valued by the private landowner, as well as by
recreators. The relevant social welfare function is (17b). We follow the same strategy as
in the previous section and start by assuming that the government has available a non-
distortionary tax.
4.1 Optimal forest taxation in the presence of a neutral tax
We consider first the use of the site productivity tax, the site value tax, and the profit tax.
These are all neutral in the Faustmann model, but depending on the nature of amenity
valuation the last two may be distortionary in the Hartman framework. Does the neutral
site productivity tax suffice for an optimal tax policy, or do we have to complement it
with another tax?
Recalling the social welfare function (17b) and the tax revenue requirement (in the
absence of other taxes), we can write down the  Lagrangian as
) ( ) 1 ( R R E n E V
H - - - + + = W
* * m , where subscript H refers to Hartman case and m is
the marginal cost of public funds. Choosing  ) (i a so as to maximize the Lagrangian yields
a first-order condition  0
1 1
= + - = W
r r
a m  ￿   1 = m . The optimal site productivity tax is
non-distortionary which results from the fact that  0 =
H
a T .
Would it be socially optimal to use also the site value tax? Differentiating the Lagrangian
with respect to b and assuming that the site productivity tax is set at the optimal level
                                                
9 Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1988) provide a similar result, not analytically but by simulation.
They offer the following illuminating interpretation: “Since the yield tax lengthens rotations and
property tax shortens rotations, specific combinations of both taxes could have a neutral effect”
(p. 375).17
results in the following first-order condition for the socially optimal site value tax  b (see
Appendix 2 for the details):
0
) 1 (
















E n T   (22)
To evaluate the optimal site value tax we utilize two facts. First, from the private first-
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T F as T
H
b , so that the effect of the site value tax depends on how the
marginal amenity valuation evolves with the age of the forest stand.
There are two possibilities depending on the nature of the amenity valuation function.
First, if amenity valuation is site-specific ( 0 ) ( = ¢ T F ) the optimal site value tax is zero.
Second, note that  0 ) ( ˆ = + = T T
H
T V E V b  implies  T T V E - = . Using this in (22) allows us






















E n , so that
solving for  b yields:
n
n ) 1 ( -
=
* b  (23)
Equation (23) is a classical  Pigouvian tax: the size of the tax reflects the size of the
externality, which in the case of identical preferences for amenity services is given by the
share of recreators among citizens.10
According to equation (23) the optimal site value tax is the same independently of
whether the privately optimal rotation age is shorter or longer than the socially optimal
one. What accounts for this interesting result? The answer lies in the sensitivity of the
                                                
10  The analogous result has been derived in Koskela and Ollikainen (1997) in the case of two18
comparative statics of the site value tax on the nature of the marginal amenity valuation.
When the marginal valuation of amenity services increases with the age of the stand
( 0 ) ( ' > T F ) the site value tax will have a positive effect on private rotation, while when
it decreases with the age ( 0 ) ( ' < T F ) the site value tax will have a negative effect on it.
For  0 ) ( ' > T F  the privately optimal rotation age is too short from the viewpoint of social
optimum, and too long for  0 ) ( ' < T F . In both cases society should use site value tax: in
the former case to lengthen and in the latter case to shorten the privately optimal rotation
age.
Since the effect of the profit tax q is identical to that of the site value tax (see equations
10 and 16), we have
Result 3. If the society values both harvest revenue and amenities from forests and
wishes to collect a given forest tax revenue, then in addition to the optimal
site productivity tax, the design of forest tax policy consists of
a)  no other taxes when amenity valuation is site specific, i.e., independent of
the age of forest stand
b)  a combination of the neutral site productivity tax and a distortionary site
value (profit) tax, which reflects the size of the externality, when the
amenity valuation increases or decreases with the age of the stand.
These findings make sense. In the presence of externality and the optimal site
productivity tax, no other taxes are needed when amenity valuation is independent of the
age of the forest stand, because all that counts are the amenities associated with the bare
land. But if the amenity valuation depends on the age of the forest stand, the site
productivity tax should be complemented with the site value tax or the profit tax by the
amount, which depends on the size of externality associated with amenity services.
If the site value and profit taxes are not feasible and then one can ask whether the harvest
and timber taxes have any role in the optimal design of forest taxation in the presence of
the site productivity tax. Since the comparative statics of the yield tax and the unit tax are
                                                                                                                                                
period model.19
qualitatively similar the Hartman model, we concentrate on the yield tax (and assume
other taxes to be absent in equation 18).
Maximizing the  Lagrangian  ) ( ) 1 ( R R E n E V
H - - - + + = W
* * l  yields the familiar
condition  1 = m  for the site productivity tax. Choosing now the yield tax, when the site-
productivity tax is at the optimal level, gives the following first-order condition
[ ] { } 0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ) ( )( 1 )( 1 ( = - ¢ - + - - - = W * =
F rT rT rT
a a
H T T pf re T f p e rE T F e n t t t   (24)
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t  we first
note that  in the special case where  0 =
H Tt , the optimal yield tax rate is zero. When
0 „
H Tt  equation (24) can be solved for the optimal yield tax to get
) ( ) ( ) 1 (
) ) ( )( 1 )( 1 (
T pf re T f p e
rE T F e n
rT rT
rT




= * t  (25)
From equation (25) we can derive several properties for the optimal yield tax depending
on the nature of the amenity valuation. First, neglecting the public goods property of
forest amenities (i.e. setting n = 1) implies that optimal yield tax would be zero. Second,
if amenities are site-specific (for which  0 ) ( = ¢ T F  and  0 ) ( = -rE T F ) optimal yield tax
would again be zero. Third, when n > 1 and  0 ) ( > ¢ T F , we have  0 ) ( > -rE T F  but
0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( < - ¢ - T pf re T f p e
rT rT , so that optimal yield tax is positive. Fourth, we have the
case where  0 ) ( < -rE T F  and  ? ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( = - ¢ - T pf re T f p e
rT rT , where the size and sign
of the optimal yield tax/subsidy remains unclear.
We can summarize our findings in
Result 4. If the society values both harvest revenue and amenities from forests and
wishes to collect a given forest tax revenue, then in addition to the optimal
site productivity tax, the design of forest tax policy consists of20
a)  no other taxes if amenity valuation is site specific, i.e., independent of
the age of forest stand
b)  a combination of the neutral site productivity tax and a distortionary
yield tax (or a unit tax) when marginal valuation of amenities increases
with the age of the stand.
c)  a combination of the neutral site productivity tax and a distortionary
yield tax/subsidy (or a unit tax/subsidy) remains unclear when marginal
valuation of amenities increases with the age of the stand.
An economic interpretation of case a) is familiar. If the amenity valuation is site-specific,
the rotation age is not distorted by the amenity valuation. Therefore the neutral site
productivity tax is enough. Cases b) and c) reflect the classical Pigouvian policy. If the
amenity valuation increases with the age of forest stand, then the private rotation age is
too low from the viewpoint of the society. By complementing the neutral site
productivity tax with the positive yield (or unit) tax has the effect of increasing the
rotation age.  Finally, if the amenity valuation decreases with the age of forest stand, then
the rotation age is too long from the society’s viewpoint. But the optimal policy remains
ambiguous because under these circumstances the effect of the harvest tax on the rotation
is ambiguous a priori.
Assume next that the site-productivity tax is set at the optimal level and ask whether we
need to introduce a timber tax to maximize the social welfare? The first-order condition
for the constrained social welfare maximization is given by
[ ] { } 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ) ( )( 1 )( 1 ( = - - + - - - = W * =
H rT rT
a a
H T rU T pf e rE T F e n a t a  (26)
Solving for the optimal timber tax yields
rU T pf
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where the denominator of (27) is positive irrespective amenity valuation, while the
numerator is positive (negative) for  0 ) ( < ¢ T F  ( 0 ) ( > ¢ T F ). The optimal timber tax is zero21
if there is no externality involved in forestry (n = 1) or amenities are site-specific
( 0 ) ( = ¢ T F ). For other cases, we can conclude that
Result 5. If the society values both harvest revenue and amenities from forests and
wishes to collect a given forest tax revenue, then in addition to the optimal
site productivity tax, the design of forest tax policy consists of
  a) a timber tax, if  the amenity valuation decreases with the age of the stand
b)  a timber subsidy if the amenity valuation increases with the age of the
stand.
The interpretation of Result 5 is obvious. When the marginal valuation of amenity
services decreases with the age of the stand, privately optimal rotation age is too long
from the society’s perspective. Therefore, a positive timber tax, which shortens the
rotation age, can be used to reduce the externality caused by private harvesting to
recreators. But when the marginal valuation of amenity services increases with the age of
the stand, privately optimal rotation age is too short from the society’s perspective, and
timber subsidy can be used to lengthen the privately optimal rotation age and reduce the
externality to recreators.
4.2 Optimal forest taxation in the absence of neutral taxes
Let us finally ask can we find, in the absence of the site productivity tax, a combination
of a unit tax and a timber tax (or a yield tax and timber tax), which in the same vein as in
the case of the Faustmann model, would produce the socially optimal rotation. Note that
in the Hartman model the neutrality property is desirable only in the case of site-specific
amenities. Otherwise we need which would internalize the externality caused by private
harvesting on recreators.
Differentiating first the Lagrangian,  ) ( ) 1 ( R R E n E V
H - - - + + = W
* * m  in the absence
of other taxes than unit and timber taxes with respect to t and a yields (see Appendix 3
for details)
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distortionary as in the Faustmann model. That happens if either n = 1, or  0 ) ( = ¢ T F .
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For the cases where the marginal valuation of amenities is not constant the following
optimality condition characterizes the combination of unit tax and timber tax, which both
collects tax revenues and eliminates the externalities in the production of amenity
services
) ) ( )( 1 ( rE T F n B tA - - - = +a , (28d)
where B > 0, while A is negative for  0 ) ( ' ‡ T F  but ambiguous for  0 ) ( ' < T F .
Interpretation goes as follows. Under  0 ) ( ' > T F  the privately optimal rotation age is too
short from the society’s viewpoint.  Relative to equation (28c) (reflecting both site-
specific amenities and the Faustmann model), the RHS of (28d) has changed from zero to
negative so that the LHS of (28d) is smaller. This means that either the unit tax rate
(which lengthens the rotation age) has to be raised above the level of the Faustmann case
or that timber tax (which shortens the rotation age) rate has to be decreased. If instead
0 ) ( ' < T F , the privately optimal rotation age is longer than the socially optimal one. The
RHS of (28d) has changed from zero to positive when compared with (28c). The term A,
however, is now a priori ambiguous and should be evaluated empirically. If A is
negative, then the combination of timber and unit tax still works to collect tax revenues
and eliminate externalities provided that the timber tax rate is increased so as to make the
LHS of equation (28d) positive. If, however, A turns out to be positive, then both taxes
affect into same direction, i.e., they tend to lengthen private rotation age. Then the only23
possibility is to introduce a timber subsidy together with the unit tax. Now the tax
collects the tax revenue, while the subsidy internalizes the externality.
Now we can summarize our findings in
Result 6:  If the society values both harvest revenue and amenity services from
forests and wishes to collect a given forest tax revenue, then in the absence
of neutral taxes,
a)  with the site-specific amenities  the government should pick a
combination of unit tax  and timber tax  (or a combination of yield tax and
timber tax) which collects the required tax revenue in a non-distortionary
way
b ) with the amenity valuation increasing  with the age of the forest stand,
the government should pick a combination of unit tax (or a combination of
yield tax and timber tax)  and timber tax which collects the required tax
revenue in a non-distortionary way
c) in the presence of amenity externalities and with the amenity valuation
decreasing with the age of the forest stand, an appropriate combination of
unit tax/subsidy and timber tax to correct externalities remains ambiguous
a priori.
5. Concluding Remarks
We studied the unexplored problem of the socially optimal design of forest taxation,
when the government wishes to collect a given tax revenue under two alternative
assumptions. First, the society values only net harvest revenue and second, it values also
amenity services from forests. Our analytical frameworks were, thus, the Faustmann and
Hartman models. In both cases we assumed that the government first announces credibly
its tax policy and then private landowners choose their rotation age in the presence of
taxes.
We demonstrated that in the Faustmann model only neutral forest taxes are needed to
maximize the welfare and collect the tax revenue. The site productive tax and the site
value tax as lump-sum property taxes, as well as the profit tax, have this neutrality24
property. If neutral taxes are not available, a combination of unit (yield) tax and timber
tax, which affect the rotation age in opposing directions and hence can eliminate each
other’s distortionary effect, can be used to collect tax revenue without distorting privately
optimal rotation age.
When forest amenities are a public good with the exception of site-specific amenity
valuation the private valuation of amenities does not reflect their social valuation. The
optimal design of forest taxation now consists of a neutral tax to collect the required tax
revenue and a distortionary tax/subsidy to correct the provision of amenity services to the
socially optimal level. While the site productivity tax is the only neutral tax among the
taxes we study, there are many possibilities for the choice of the distortionary Pigouvian
tax or subsidy. When the private optimal rotation age is too short from the society’s
viewpoint (amenity valuation increases with the age of the stand), a yield, unit or timber
tax could be levied on the landowner so as to lengthen rotation age. Respectively, by a
yield, unit or timber subsidy the society can shorten the privately optimal rotation age if
it is too long from the society’s viewpoint (amenity valuation decreases with the age of
the stand). The site value tax has the same properties as a corrective tax. Interestingly,
however, a site value or a profit tax related to the size of externality always corrects the
externality irrespectively of the nature of the amenity valuation. Finally, we have shown
that a combination of unit (yield) and timber taxes can be used to collect the tax revenue
and internalize the externality, when the marginal valuation of amenity services is non-
decreasing in the age of the stand, but ambiguous for decreasing marginal valuation.
In this paper we have studied the socially optimal forest taxation when the rotation period
of a forest stand is independent of that of other adjacent stands, private or public. Forest
stands may,  however, be interdependent in producing amenity services. It would be an
interesting area for research to analyze the impacts of this potential interdependence for
the socially optimal forest taxation.25
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List of symbols:
) (T f  growth function of a stand
T rotation age
p real stumpage price
c real regeneration cost
r real interest rate
t  yield tax (levied on the stumpage value of timber harvested)
t unit tax (levied on the volume of timber harvested)
b annual lump-sum tax payment (levied on the landowner)
b  site value tax (annual lump-sum tax b related to the value of the land)
a(i) site productivity tax for site i (a lump-sum tax levied on the productivity of site i)
a  timber tax (levied on the stumpage value)
q profit tax (levied on the net harvest revenue)
) (T F  amenity valuation function
F T  Faustmann rotation age
H T  Hartman rotation age
V    the net present value of harvest revenue over infinite rotations
E the present value of amenity services over infinite rotations
W  the net present value of harvest revenue plus the present value of amenity services
over infinite rotations27
Appendix 1. Derivation of Equations (22a) and (22b)
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Appendix 2. Derivation of Equation (24)
Differentiating the  Lagrangian  ) ( ) 1 ( R R E n E V - - - + + = W
* * m , where
[ ] r a e ce T pf R
rT rT + - - =
-1 ) 1 )( ) ( ( b  with respect to a implies that m = 1. Choosing now
b optimally yields
{ } 0 ) 1 ( = + + + - = W
= T T T T
H
a a
H R E V E n T m b b   A2.1
Accounting for the fact that  0 = + T T V E  at the landowner’s optimum, we can express
A2.1 as
{ } 0 ) 1 ( = + - = W * = T T
H
a a
H R E n Tb b ,  A2.2
where the derivative of the tax revenue function with respect to T is28
[ ]
rT rT rT rT
rT T e ce T pf r rce T f p e
e
R ) ) ( ( ) ) ( )( 1 (
) 1 (




Since  [ ]
rT rT rT rT
rT T e ce T pf r rce T f p e
e









b , we have





































b b b ,  A2.3




* b , which was given in equation (23) of the text.
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Appendix 3. Derivation of Equations (28a) and (28b)
The  Lagrangian function can be written as  ) ( ) 1 ( R R E n E V - - - + + = W
* * m , where
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which were given in the text.
 *   *   *   *   *